Administrative Accountability and Judicial Review: Balancing Executive Discretion with the Rule of Law

Abstract

Background: Every modern administration depends on discretion, yet discretion unchecked by law is the classic route to arbitrary rule. Judicial review is the principal legal device through which courts police that boundary, but its capacity to deliver real accountability, rather than ritual scrutiny, remains contested. Objective: To examine, analytically and comparatively, how courts in the United Kingdom, India, the United States, the European Union and Germany, and South Africa reconcile executive discretion with the rule of law, and to expose the gap between doctrine and administrative reality. Methods: A PRISMA-informed structured doctrinal and empirical-literature review was conducted, restricted to sources published up to 2024, combining leading judgments, constitutional and statutory texts, empirical impact studies and comparative indices. Results: Five findings emerged. First, jurisdictions converge on structured, proportionality-type reasoning but diverge sharply on judicial deference. Second, empirical evidence indicates that the practical value of review lies less in quashing decisions than in settlement, administrative learning and deterrence. Third, legislatures and executives increasingly narrow review through ouster clauses, remedial limits and procedural barriers. Fourth, doctrine is volatile, as the reversal of Chevron deference in 2024 shows. Fifth, algorithmic and data-driven decision-making strains inherited review techniques. Conclusions: The balance between discretion and legality is not a settled equilibrium but a continuously renegotiated one. A calibrated, context-sensitive model of review, supported by internal accountability and transparency duties, offers a more defensible settlement than either judicial maximalism or deference.